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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest benefits of arbitration is the amount of time
saved in resolving disputes.1 While the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2
states that the enforceability of arbitration agreements is its primary goal,
it also promotes the policy favoring speedy and efficient dispute resolution.
Ironically, however, one of the potential negatives of dispute resolution
through arbitration is the possibility that the arbitration may not proceed
quickly enough for a party to protect property interests. For this reason,
the availability of preliminary relief, which takes the form of prehearing
attachment of assets, and the preliminary injunction, is especially
important.
With regard to the availability of such provisional relief, a
distinction must be drawn between judicial prehearing relief in aid of
arbitration and arbitrator-awarded prehearing relief. Although the
authority of arbitrators to order interim relief in arbitration cases has
rarely been challenged, the passage of the FAA has raised the question of
the judiciary's authority to order such relief.
Judicially or arbitrator-imposed provisional remedies are not
specifically mentioned in the FAA.' For this reason, as well as the fact
that resolution of the dispute is pending in another forum, courts are
especially reluctant to intervene 5
The FAA provides that if a suit is brought upon an issue subject
to arbitration under the parties' agreement, the court "shall on application
of one of the parties, stay the trial of the action" until the arbitration is
concluded.' Thus, the FAA mandates the judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements. Because prior to the enactment of the FAA such
1. See Steven A. Meyerowitz, 7he Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985,
78, 80.
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
3. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). In Byrd, the Court found
that the congressional intent of the Federal Arbitration Act required federal courts to enforce
agreements to arbitrate pendent state law arbitrable claims regardless of the fact that they are
"intertwined" with a federal claim that is not subject to arbitration. Id.
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
5. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir.
1984). Granting preliminary injunctive relief in an arbitrable dispute runs counter to the
congressional policy that the arbitration forum be speedy and not subject to delay or
interference by the courts. Id. at 1292.
6. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
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agreements were unenforceable at common law,7 the question of the
suitability of court-ordered provisional remedies is a contemporary subject
of dispute among the lower courts.,
An example of such conflict is evidenced in Roso-Lino Bev.
Distrib. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.' Coca-Cola notified Roso-Lino that it
intended to terminate Roso-Lino's Coca-Cola distributorship."0 Roso-
Lino brought suit claiming wrongful termination and sought a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Coca-Cola from terminating the distributorship.n
Coca-Cola countered with a cross-motion for an order directing the parties
to arbitration.' The district court directed the parties to arbitration on
the wrongful termination claim and denied Roso-Lino's motion for a
preliminary injunction."
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the denial of the
preliminary injunction because it appeared from the record that the district
court believed that its decision to order arbitration eliminated its power to
grant an interim remedy.' While courts differ on this issue, the Second
Circuit held that an order to arbitrate does not relieve the court of its
obligation to consider the merits of the requested provisional relief.'
The United States Supreme Court has not considered the
appropriateness of judicially imposed provisional relief in pending
arbitration cases. Consequently, state and federal circuit courts are
divided on whether the FAA confers jurisdiction upon courts to issue
preliminary relief in such instances.16
7. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-122 (1924) (finding
New York's arbitration act constitutional and pronouncing the history of the common law
with regard to the enforceability of arbitration agreements).
8. See generally David L. Zicherman, The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and
Temporary Injunctions in Intenaional Commeroial Arbitration Proceedings: A Comparative
Analysis of the British and American Approaches, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 667 (1989).
9. 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 125.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Roso-Lino Bev. Distrib. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 124 (2d Cir.
1984).
15. Id.
16. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1287
(8th Cir. 1984) (standing for the proposition that injunctive relief is never available);
Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that a court may
order preliminary relief whenever the preliminary tests for such relief are satisfied - usually
involving some consideration of the merits of the case); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the issuance of
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Some courts have required the party seeking provisional relief to
demonstrate a significant probability of success on the merits in an
arbitration setting before the court will issue interim remedies.' 7 Other
courts have held that the language and the purposes of the FAA prevent
judicial issuance of such preliminary remedies in all cases.' Still other
courts conclude that judicial interim relief is proper only when the parties
have specifically contemplated this type of judicial intercession.1"
This Note proposes several arguments in favor of the adoption of
a standard approach to court issuances of preliminary relief which would
turn on the contractual language of the arbitration agreement. Section II
of this Note briefly sets forth the different approaches taken by the lower
courts in interpreting the congressional intent of the FAA with regard to
the judicial role in providing provisional relief. Section II sets out the
three classifications of state and federal court treatment of the propriety of
judicially-imposed provisional relief in arbitration disputes. Section IV
contends that such judicial intervention is proper only when it was
contemplated and explicitly provided for in the contract by the affected
parties. Section V supports this theory by examining the pure contractual
nature of arbitration agreements and the alternatives available to the parties
under this view. Section VI argues that judicial interference in the
arbitration process, through court-granted preliminary relief, jeopardizes
the independence of the arbitral process and frustrates the intent of parties
entering into arbitration agreements. Therefore, court-granted preliminary
relief should be allowed only when it is provided for in the parties'
agreement.
II. THE BASIS FOR JUDICIAL INCONSISTENCY
Provisional relief is a short-term remedy available to the plaintiff
an injunction by the judiciary is appropriate only when the enjoined conduct would render the
arbitration process a 'hollow formality"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
McCollum, 666 S.W.2d 604, 608 (rex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the court must look to
the arbitration agreement itself for authority to issue preliminary relief).
17. See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1986); PMS
Distrib. Co. v. Huber & Suhner, A.G., 854 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1988); Sauer-Getriebe KG v.
White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983).
18. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574 F. Supp.
1472 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
19. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286
(8th Cir. 1984); Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d. 1163 (8th Cir.
1984); Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1980).
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in order to maintain the status quo while the action is pending." The
American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules explicitly provide
arbitrators with the authority to award any remedy that they deem just and,
specifically, to award preliminary relief.'
Today, it is clearly recognized that an arbitrator-has the power to
award provisional remedies.' Historically, however, arbitrators did not
have control over cases until the time of the hearing. Thus, many states
enacted statutes that provided for judicial prehearing relief in aid of the
arbitration process.' As a result, dual control over the ordering of
provisional remedies exists in the context of arbitral disputes today.
Three conditions have laid the foundation for the unsettled state of
the law regarding court-ordered provisional relief in arbitrable disputes:
1) the legislative confusion over judicial jurisdictional limits in arbitration
proceedings, 2) the traditional jealousy of the courts for maintenance of
their jurisdiction, ' and 3) the silence of the FAA on this issue." The
current division among the circuits will persist until the issue is addressed
by the Supreme Court.
H. CLASSIFICATIONS OF JUDICIAL TREATMENT
"Courts have taken widely divergent positions on when a district
court should issue an injunction [or attach a defendant's assets] to maintain
the status quo pending arbitration pursuant to the [FAA]." 2' There are
three general classifications into which the courts' treatment of this issue
may be grouped: 1) the Equitable Analysis Approach, 2) the Availability
of Redress Approach, and 3) the Contractual Language Approach.
20. BiAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1224 (6th ed. 1990).
21. AM. ARB. ASS'N, SEc. ARB. R. 43 and 34 (1989).
22. Under the Uniform Code of Arbitration, a party may seek a prehearing conference
to seek a preliminary injunction. UNIFORM CODE OF ARB. § 20 (d)-(e), reprinted in FOURTH
REP. SEC. INDUS. CONF. ON ARB., Exhibit C (Nov. 1984). Also, under the AAA Securities
Arbitration Rules the arbitrators are expressly empowered to "issue such orders for interim
relief as may be deemed necessary to safeguard the property which is the subject matter of
the arbitration' indicates that the arbitrators may use the prehearing conference for the
purpose of ordering preliminary relief. AM. ARB. ASS'N, SEc. ARB. R. 10 (1989).
23. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 7502 (c) (McKinney 1993 Supp.) (allowing
court-ordered prehearing attachment and preliminary injunctions in aid of arbitration).
24. See Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639 (3d Cir. 1898).
25. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
26. Philip E. Karmel, Comment, Injunctions Pending Arbitration and the Federal
Arbitration Act: A Perspective From Contract Law, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1987).
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A. Equitable Analysis Approach
The Equitable Analysis Approach involves the application of each
court's standard test used to determine whether interim relief is equitable
in cases pending in a judicial forum. While the specific formulation of the
test differs among the jurisdictions, one fundamental attribute is shared by
all courts following this approach. Each jurisdiction requires the court to
weigh the merits of the case itself in order to appraise the plaintiff's
likelihood of success before interim relief will be granted.
For example, the First Circuit held that in order to warrant
preliminary injunctive relief, a court must find: 1) that the party
requesting such relief will suffer irreparable harm if it is not granted, 2)
that this injury outweighs any harm which granting injunctive relief would
inflict on the other party, 3) that the proponent of the preliminary remedy
is likely to succeed on the merits, and 4) that public interests will not be
adversely affected by such a grant.' The First, Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits all support the view that a court should grant provisional
relief whenever, pending arbitration, such a remedy is shown to be
necessary to preserve the status quo via the traditional equity test.?
Proponents of the Equitable Analysis Approach contend that
judicial issuance of preliminary relief is not precluded by the FAA.'
They argue that because the FAA was passed with a primary goal of
enforcement of arbitration agreements,' courts may issue provisional
27. Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981). However,
the district court will be reversed if the reviewing court finds that it erred in applying the
legal standard to the plaintiff's likely success on the merits or if it erred in applying the law
to the facts of the case. Id. at 1009.
28. See, e.g., Roso-Lino Bev. Distrib. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding that the fact that a dispute was to be settled through arbitration did not
strip the court of its power to grant injunctive relief and that the proper course of action was
for the court to determine whether the dispute was a proper case for an injunction); PMS
Distrib. Co. v. Huber & Suhner, A.G., 854 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the fact
that a dispute is arbitrable under Section Four of the FAA does not strip the court of the
authority to order a writ of possession); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st
Cir. 1986) (holding that a preliminary remedy can be granted by a court when it is necessary
to protect the damages remedy when the four relevant criterion are met); Sauer-Getriebe KG
v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the right to arbitrate
and seek injunctive relief were not incompatible and that the plaintiff was entitled to
injunctive relief having satisfied the requisite tests for a preliminary injunction).
29. Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 51.
30. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985). The Supreme
Court held that the "[p]assage of the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements [to arbitrate] into which parties had entered....
Id.
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relief if such issuance augments the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 31
While it is clear that the primary goal of the FAA is to assure the
execution of arbitration agreements, some consideration must be given to
the purpose behind the decision to promote the arbitration method of
dispute resolution in the first place. As the Supreme Court stated,
"Congress' clear intent . . . [was] to move the parties to an arbitrable
dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as
possible,"' and the FAA requires an "expeditious... hearing, with only
restricted inquiry into factual issues."' A court's review of the merits of
a case appears to delay arbitration, thereby frustrating the congressional
mandate for expeditious presentation of the substance of the controversy to
the arbitrators. '  Moreover, judicial involvement in the rest of the
arbitration process is severely limited, and necessarily so, in order that the
objectives bargained for by the parties may be realized. 35
There are numerous reasons for a party to enter into an
arbitration agreement. For example, the parties may want a person with
expertise and familiarity with the issues involved to hear the dispute.
Arbitration clauses are popular in contracts because parties usually have
the option to select the arbitrators who will decide their cases.' On the
other hand, the parties may bargain for the accelerated and less expensive
process that arbitration generally affords.3' Additionally, arbitration can
offer the anonymity that a court setting cannot. ' However, despite a
party's possible myriad of motives for entering into an arbitration
agreement, judicial involvement, even at the preliminary stages, could
undermine a party's goals in consenting to the agreement.
Another contention that counters those offered by the proponents
of the Equitable Analysis Approach involves the courts' conflicting
31. Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 51.
32. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
33. Id.
34. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. 1472,
1478-79 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
35. See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv., 628 F.2d 81, 83
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying judicial review of an arbitration decision).
36. Trade Policy: AAA President Says Use of Arbitration Increasing to Resolve Trade
Disputes, [3 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1204 (October 1, 1986).
37. Id. at 1204.
38. Id.
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interpretations of the congressional intent of the FAA?' The Equitable
Analysis Approach is based on the assumption that the courts are
authorized to treat the issue of provisional relief in pending arbitration
cases as within the jurisdiction of the judiciary. However, the uncertainty
existing among the courts regarding the accuracy of this presumption casts
serious doubt on the foundation of this approach.
The general reluctance of the courts to involve themselves in
other aspects of ongoing arbitrations suggests another ground for
questioning the soundness of the Equitable Analysis Approach." Because
the courts are disinclined to intervene in other forums, it is not apparent
that the occasion to impose interim remedies in cases pending arbitration
would be ardently exercised by the judicial system as a whole.
Advocates of this approach argue that the preliminary court
findings regarding the enjoining party's prospect of prevailing in
arbitration are made under the assumption that the findings are not binding
on the subsequent proceeding on the merits.'1 However, it would be
unreasonable to ignore the possibility that such a determination may
influence the outcome of the arbitration proceedings and impede the
arbitrator's independent determination of the merits.C The danger of
interference 'with the arbitrator's independent determination of the
issues "' created by merely requiring that the traditional equitable
criterion be satisfied further supports the contention that the Equitable
Analysis Approach is an inappropriate standard.
B. Availability of Redress Approach
The Availability of Redress Approach is a more liberal method
for finding the appropriateness of judicial issuance of provisional
remedies. This approach was defined by the Fourth Circuit in Merrill
39. See, e.g., Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241,
1242 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ('Nothing in the [FAA] contemplates interference by the court in an
ongoing arbitration proceeding .... Such action by the court would vitiate the purpose of the
[FAA].. .. "); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (noting that
courts should enforce the agreement of the parties rather than substitute their own judgments
concerning the most expeditious manner of resolution of the dispute in order to realize the
legislative intent of the FAA).
40. See, e.g., Suarez-Valdez v. Shearson LehmanlAm. Express, Inc., 858 F.2d 648
(l1th Cir. 1988) (directing the parties to proceed under the rules of the forum agreed to and
not the court rules).
41. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
42. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. DeCaro, 577 F. Supp. 616, 624
(W.D. Mo. 1983).
43. Id.
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Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley."M The Fourth Circuit
rejected the Equitable Analysis Approach due to its focus on the
examination of the merits of the case, and instead employed the "hollow
formality" test.45 The "hollow formality" test focuses on the ability to
return the parties to the status quo, thereby eliminating many of the
difficulties associated with focusing on an examination of the case on its
merits. 41 The "hollow formality" test, therefore, involves the
determination of whether the proponent of the preliminary relief could
obtain redress through arbitration without the aid of a court-ordered
interim remedy.4' Accordingly, judicial interim relief is appropriate only
when "the arbitral award when rendered could not return the parties
substantially to the status quo ante."'
The court in Bradley stated that nothing in Section Three of the
FAA denied the equitable authority of the courts to enter preliminary
injunctions pending arbitration, and that this interpretation furthers the
policies of the FAA by ensuring that the process of resolving the dispute
would be meaningful.' The court also suggested that such judicially
granted provisional relief actually advances rather than frustrates the
congressional intent of the FAA.!
While this approach purports to further the goals of Section Three
of the FAA, it fails to consider the intent of the contracting parties.
Because it is clear that under modem legislation arbitrators have the
authority to make interlocutory orders relevant to the arbitration prior to
the hearing, the Fourth Circuit approach, like the Equitable Analysis
Approach, denies the parties the power to contract for such judicial
disassociation.' For this reason, the Availability of Redress Approach to
this issue actually frustrates the freedom of the parties to enter into an
arbitration agreement and fails to adequately address the policy concerns
of the FAA.
Although both the Availability of Redress Approach and the
44. 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
45. A preliminary measure may be granted by the court only if the measure sought
"would render that process a 'hollow formality.' Id. at 1053.
46. See supra notes 32, 34, 41-43 and accompanying text.
47. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053.
48. Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 123
(4th Cir. 1976).
49. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1054 (4th
Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 1053-54.
51. See supra note 22.
52. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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Equitable Analysis Approach have been employed by a number of circuits,
the foregoing criticisms of these approaches suggest that their utility as a
universal method for determining the appropriateness of judicially-granted
provisional relief is limited.
C. The Contractual Language Approach
An amalgamation of the Eighth and Second Circuits' tests for the
issuance of a court-ordered preliminary remedy in the context of an
arbitration dispute is both the most limited and the most suitable of the
three approaches to the role of the courts in the arbitration process. The
Contractual Language Approach involves the examination of the language
of the contract containing the arbitration clause. '
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Hovey, ' the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided that a preliminary injunction was
inappropriate in an arbitrable case where the parties did not specifically
provide for it in their agreement. The Second Circuit, in Guinness-Harp
Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. ' delineated the Hovey Contractual
Language Approach further still by utilizing the traditional equitable
requirements for interim relief. The court held that an injunction issued
by the lower court to enforce the status quo provision of the parties'
agreement during arbitration was available in this case.' Additionally,
the court concluded that the traditional requirements of a preliminary
injunction did not have to be met, but rather the movant was entitled to
injunctive relief to enforce its interpretation of the status quo provision of
the agreement.' This showing requires the satisfaction of the traditional
equitable standards for specific performance of the contract.O
Thus, under the Hovey Court's approach, it must be clear, by the
language of the agreement, that the parties contemplated the maintenance
of the status quo.-" Once this determination has been made, the court
must then consider whether the party requesting the relief is entitled to
specific performance of the status quo provision of the contract under
53. See, e.g., RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assoc., Inc., 858 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1988)
(noting that the court may grant a preliminary injunction only if the language of the contract
requires the parties to maintain the status quo judicially pending the resolution of their
disputes).
54. 726 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1984).
55. 613 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 473.
57. Id. at 472.
58. Id. at 471.
59. Id.
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conventional equity principles." This approach eliminates the judicial
evaluation of the ultimate merits of the case while perpetuating the
contractual intent of the parties.
Clearly, the concerns addressed in the discussion of the Equitable
Analysis and the Availability of Redress Approaches are disposed of when
the Contractual Language Analysis is employed. The court no longer
considers the merits of the fundamental controversy,61 and furthers,
rather than frustrates, the intent of the parties.
IV. ANALYSIS op THE CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE APPROACH
The necessity of judicial intervention for the purpose of granting
preliminary relief is minimal in most cases because there is legislative
recognition of an arbitrator's authority to provide provisional remedies for
the parties to an arbitration agreement.a Absent legal constraints, an
arbitrator's crafting of equitable relief is limited only by the arbitration
agreement itself.' Thus, the contracting parties have the opportunity to
choose the forum in which their primary and preliminary disputes will be
settled.
Advocates of limiting judicial issuance of interim remedies
contend that preliminary relief is often essential prior to the time when the
arbitrators have been appointed." This opposition may be countered
with references to legislation enacted to govern arbitration proceedings.
Pursuant to the Uniform Code of Arbitration, a party seeking a
preliminary remedy may request a prehearing conference at any time prior
to the arbitration hearing.' Furthermore, under the Uniform Code of
Arbitration, the National Association of Securities Dealers Code of
60. Karmel, supra note 26, at 1385.
61. The proponent of the provisional remedy need only show that the contractual
language provides for the maintenance of the status quo rather than his or her possible
success on the merits since he or she is seeking a final rather than a preliminary remedy.
Karmel, supra note 26, at 1384.
62. See, e.g., supra note 22; see also UNIFORM CODE OF ARB., § 20(d)(1), reprinted in
FOURTH REP. SEC. INDUS. CONF. ON ARB., Exhibit C, (Nov. 1984); NASD CODE OF ARB.
PROc. § 32(d)(1); NYSE ARB. R. 619(d)(1) (entitling a party to request a decision of a single
arbitrator on the issue of provisional remedies if the preliminary dispute cannot be decided in
the required prehearing conference).
63. See, e.g., Local 345 Retail Store Employees Union v. Heinrich Motors, Inc., 473
N.E.2d 247 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1984).
64. Anthony S. Fiotto, Note, The United States Arbitration Act and Peliminary
Injunctions: A New Interpretation of an Old Statute, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1041, 1059 (1986).
65. See supra note 22.
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Arbitration Procedure, and the New York Stock Exchange Arbitration
Rules, a party may request a decision of a single arbitrator on the issue of
provisional remedies when the issue cannot be remedied at the prehearing
conference." Consequently, a party in a pending arbitration case will
not be deprived of interim remedies merely because the arbitrators who
will hear the case have not yet been appointed.
Opponents also offer the arbitrators' lack of jurisdiction to enforce
compliance with the ordered interim remedy as support for court-issued
preliminary relief in arbitral cases.' Notwithstanding this shortcoming,
an arbitration order is given full effect in the courts; thus the party seeking
relief is assured enforcement indirectly through court intervention. The
American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules also expressly provide for
the issuance of preliminary awards by the tribunal in order to safeguard
the property that is the subject matter of the dispute."
Further proof of the soundness of the Contractual Language
Analysis Approach is evidenced in its employment in international
arbitration disputes. Under the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) rules, judicially-granted interim relief is
improper unless the parties have specifically provided for it in their
agreement."
The Third Circuit followed this development within the context of
the international arbitration arena. It has held that the ICSID rules
preempt the FAA's neutral approach to judicially-granted interim relief *so
that it no longer gives courts the authority to grant pre-judgment
attachments or temporary injunctions. "" While there are opinions to the
contrary,' the majority of the international arbitration legislation and
case law represent a presumption favoring the Contractual Language
66. See supra note 62.
67. Fiotto, supra note 64, at 1060.
68. Steven J. Stein & Daniel R. Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in the
1980s: A Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAw. 1685, 1708 &
n.150 (1983); see AM. ARB. Ass', COM. ARB. R. 34 (eff. April 1, 1992).
69. Zicherman, supra note 8, at 684; see Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Aug. 25 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965).
70. Id. at 688; see also McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d
Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Ateliers do Ia Motobecane, S.A., 442 N.E.2d 1239 (Ct. App. N.Y.
1982).
71. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie., S.A., 430 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
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Approach."
Because 1) timely arbitrator-provided provisional relief is
generally available to the parties, 2) arbitrators' orders are given full effect
in the courts, and 3) legislation in the international arbitration area favors
judicial abstinence, the Contractual Language Approach renders a viable
solution for the current disharmony among the lower courts regarding this
issue.
V. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS iN THE CONTEXT OF CONTRACr LAW
The FAA was enacted to reverse the traditional judicial hostility
toward arbitration contracts and to put these agreements on the "same
footing" as other contracts.' Section Two of the FAA is the guiding
provision on the issue of the contractual nature of arbitration agreements.
Section Two provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.'
Section Two of the FAA makes clear the congressional intent to treat
agreements to arbitrate as pure contracts which shall be enforced in the
same manner as any other contract. For this reason, this Note briefly
turns to the area of contract law, and, more specifically, to equitable
relief, in order to evaluate the various courts' treatment of provisional
relief in arbitrable disputes.
The fundamental rule in a court's interpretation of a contract is
72. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Scott No. 83-2052 (D.
Kan. 1983); Smith v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 904 (N.D.
Tex. 1983); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
73. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
74. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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that the intention of the parties is to be ascertainedus and effect is to be
given to that intention if it can be done without usurping other legal
principles.7 '
When a party to an arbitration agreement that provides for the
settlement of all disputes arising under the contract petitions the court for a
preliminary remedy, the petitioning party is in breach of the terms of the
agreement. Because the substitutive relief (i.e. damages) would not
protect the expectancy of the party bargaining specifically for an
arbitration forum, specific performance of the arbitration contract would
provide relief where the legal remedies are inadequate. 77 Accordingly,
the provisions of the governing agreement should provide the basis for
allowing or denying judicial intervention in the arbitration process.
An agreement that is not contrary to public policy and that is
formed between competent parties is a contract that is constitutionally
protected.' An agreement to arbitrate all disputes, including any
requested interim remedies, falls into the category of contracts that the
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution was designed to protect.
The Contracts Clause prohibits the enactment of any law that will
impair "the Obligation of Contracts. " The Contracts Clause prevents
the states from passing statutes that would alleviate contractual obligations
of a party to a contract." Because arbitration agreements are contracts
by nature, the judicial granting of provisional remedies by the state courts
conflicts directly with the intent of the Contracts Clause.
The House Report on the FAA makes clear that: "[a]rbitration
agreements are purely matters of contract and the effect of the bill is
simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement."91
Consequently, the legitimate burden placed upon the courts should be an
analysis of the contract and of whether the contract contemplates judicial
involvement in prehearing remedies. This method of determining the
propriety of such judicial intervention is advanced in the Contractual
75. See, e.g., U.S. v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950); Liberty Nat'! Bank v. Aetna
Life & Casualty Co., 568 F. Supp. 860 (D.NJ. 1983); Do Freitas v. Cote, 174 N.E.2d 371
(Mass. 1961); O'Neidl v. German, 97 N.E.2d 8 (Ohio 1951).
76. See, e.g., U.S. v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494 (1900); Insurance Co. v. Gridley,
100 U.S. 614 (1879).
77. See Alan Schwartz, 7he Casefor Specific Perfonance, 89 YALE LJ. 271 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1898).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (This law does not apply to the federal government.).
80. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUrION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY, 103
(1973).
81. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Seas., at 1-2 (1924).
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Language Approach s' and supports the argument for its unilateral
adoption.
VI. MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATION
While the enactment of the FAA was inspired by the desire to
enforce arbitration agreements, ' an interpretation of the FAA policy to
mean merely that the courts should abstain from deciding the merits of the
dispute underestimates the breadth of the congressional intent. Plagued
with judicial rebellion against the arbitration process as an alternative
forum," Congress enacted the FAA to reverse the courts' hostile
treatment of arbitration and to establish its independence from judicial
encroachment.8s
The scope of the FAA is broad. It requires enforcement of all
arbitration clauses, including executory provisions. ' The FAA mandates
a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration when an arbitration
agreement governs the dispute.' Although there are areas within the
FAA which are ambiguous, it is clear that the Act dictates a policy of
forum independence.
This interpretation has gone unrecognized by many courts. Both
the Equitable Analysis Approach and the Availability of Redress Approach
require heavy judicial involvement despite the absence of contemplation of
such involvement by the contracting parties.' Therefore, courts should
first identify and give full effect to the intent of the parties.'
Often, parties enter arbitration agreements for the sole purpose of
82. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
83. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
84. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1898):
[W]e cannot agree that it is competent for the parties to any contract,
by any stipulation which they may make a part of it, to oust the
jurisdiction of the courts, and substitute for them an extra-legal tribunal
of their own creation . . . IThey] seek to accomplish what the law
forbids,-the complete abrogation of the authority which it has conferred
upon the courts.
Id.
85. Scherkv. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974).
86. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 29-61 and accompanying text.
89. ARTHuR L. CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 538 (1952).
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avoiding costly litigation or of avoiding judicial intervention altogether."
Consequently, a court-ordered injunction would be contrary to the parties'
intent because the party opposing the judicial order would be forced to
utilize, in his defense, the very forum which he bargained to avoid. A
tribunal's refusal to enforce a contractual term requiring judicial
abstinence, therefore, is in fact a rejection of the policies underlying the
FAA.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the enactment of the FAA and the policy concerns it
attempts to employ throughout the dispute resolution system, the traditional
judicial hostility toward any perceived ouster from its jurisdiction" still
exists today. In order to disseminate this sequestered hostility, this Note
suggests unilateral adoption of the Contractual Language Approach, an
integration of the techniques employed by the Eighth and Second Circuits.
In doing so, courts would validate the legislative intent of the FAA and
would uphold the Contracts Clause of the Constitution while affording
recognition to the intent of the parties to the arbitration agreement.
Cynthia Jeanne Butler
90. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc. v. DeCaro, 577 F. Supp.
616, 625 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574
F. Supp. 1472, 1478 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
91. See generally H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).

